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at the Beginning of the 
Nineteenth Century 
Linda K. Salvucci 
In his 1984 assessment of the state of historical research, "The Transatlan-
tic Economy," Jacob Price comments: "The writing of most early American 
economic history has concentrated upon supply. For many branches of the 
economy, the great unexplored frontier may well be demand." The rela-
tionship between Philadelphia and Havana is a case in point. From the 
onset of the American Revolution until well past the end of the Napole-
onic Wars, the port cities of Havana and Philadelphia were inextricably 
linked. As their own rich hinterlands expanded, and as established trans-
atlantic trade routes disintegrated, Havana and Philadelphia grew ever closer, 
exerting profound influences upon their respective regional economies and 
merchants. Spaniards and Cubans alike considered Philadelphia the prin-
cipal entrepot for United States foodstuffs shipped to the island while 
Havana emerged as the leading market for American exports through Phila-
delphia. This close relationship between the two ports predated the strong 
links between the newly independent nation and the Spanish colony that 
characterized most of the nineteenth century and contributed to the War 
of 1898. However, it was during the early years, from the l779os through 
the 1820s, that the fortunes of Philadelphia and Havana were most deeply 
affected by their reciprocal trade.1 
In his seminal 1974 essay Jacob Price noted that the West Indies served 
as a key outlet for provisions from Philadelphia since the time of its foun-
dation. On the eve of the American Revolution, Philadelphia was the prin-
cipal Bour exporter in North America. Unfortunately, no reliable quan-
titative estimates of Philadelphia's early trade with Cuba are available. It 
is likely, however, that some of its products found their way from neighbor-
ing Caribbean islands to Havana despite official restrictions of direct trade.2 
During the Revolutionary War, the governments of both the United States 
and Spain encouraged contact between the two ports. Then Spain tried 
to once again close its colony to American shippers in 1784 This belated 
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reversion to mercantilist policies proved unsuccessful. 3 Within a few years 
Cuba's sugar revolution was in full swing while hostilities in Europe en-
sured the United States a predominant role in the supply of foodstuffs, do-
mestic manufactures, European reexports, shipping services, and slaves to 
the island's burgeoning population. These American goods were exchanged 
for sugar, specie, and tropical produce. 
More often than not, Havana importers and bakers specified a preference 
for "Philadelphia flour" while Philadelphia merchants assumed highly visi-
ble roles in the trade. Spanish policymakers struggled vainly to exert some 
control by means of an increased consular presence along the eastern sea-
board. The ranking Spanish commercial official resided in Philadelphia. 
He and his subordinates were supposed to issue licenses for selected ship-
ments of grain and other necessities to the island. Their correspondence, 
however, offers a striking testimony of the extent to which North Ameri-
cans had already penetrated the Cuba market, scandalously flaunting Bour-
bon regulations and frequenting the colony's ports "as if they were their 
own."4 This type of qualitative evidence strongly suggests that United States 
trade to Cuba was centered in Philadelphia at the beginning of the nine-
teenth century. Complete runs of quantitative data are scarce for the years 
before 1820. Extant sources include records of ship departures and arrivals 
as well as flour price series for the respective ports. Later volume and value 
export statistics offer some insights into the significance of the Havana 
market for Philadelphia. 
For example, American customs officials compiled lists of clearances 
from Philadelphia to all foreign and domestic ports. These clearances may 
serve as a minimum indicator of direct trade and as a rough indicator of 
Cuban demand. 5 Between 1794 and 1822 the number of recorded depar-
tures from Philadelphia to Cuba grew on average by 4 percent per year, 
a sizeable rate of increase that implies a doubling of traffic every seventeen 
years. 6 Let us examine the patterns more closely. From 1794 to 1802, but 
particularly during the "first neutral trade" of 1797-99, outbound traffic 
grew steadily. Following a brief drop in 1802-3, coinciding with the Peace 
of Amiens and a lack of circulating specie in Havana, declared sailings 
from Philadelphia increased sharply. With the resumption of global hostili-
ties and the proclamation of the "second neutral trade" from 1805 to 1807, 
they reached an all-time peak in 1806 and 1807. Data for the first several 
months of 1808 are missing, but it is clear that Philadelphians dispatched 
ships to Havana even during the embargo imposed by President Jefferson. 7 
After this measure was superseded by the Non-Intercourse Act in March 
1809, clearances to Cuba increased although they failed to match pre-
embargo levels. Between 1809 and 1813 Philadelphia departures declined 
precipitously, as the British Navy interfered with much American shipping. 
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Table 2..1. Recorded Ship Traffic between Philadelphia and Cuba, 1783- 182.2. 
Year Cleared for Arrived from 
All Cuba Havana All Cuba Havana 
1783 n.a. n.a. [22) n. a. n.a. [18] 
1784 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1785 n.a. n.a. [1] n.a. n.a. 
1786 n.a. n.a. [2] n.a. n.a. [5] 
1787 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. (1] 
1788 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. (1 ] 
1789 n.a. n.a. 3 1 (Aug.-Dec.) 
1790 n.a. n.a. 4 3 [5] 
1791 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1792 n.a. n.a. 8 8 
1793 6 6 n.a. n.a. [9] 
1794 33 32 n.a. n.a. [41] 
1795 23 22 29 29 (Jan.-June) [34] 
1796 18 17 40 35 [35] 
1797 37 32 [48)n.a. n.a. 
1798 59 56 (58) 62 53 
1799 75 63 75 69 
1800 69 62 84 70 
1801 93 82 (98] 98 88 
1802 [23) 23 20 40 34 
1803 [13) 17 7 [20] 20 17 
1804 39 15 (39) 13 5 (Jan.-May) 
Once -the War of 1812 concluded, sailings from Philadelphia to Cuba again 
displayed a positive trend, which continued into the next decade, well past 
1818, when Spain granted Cuba the right to free trade in the world market. 8 
To recapitulate, surviving U.S. customs records point to a vigorous and 
generally growing trade from Philadelphia to Cuba throughout the Napo-
leonic Era. (See table 2.i.) The trend was not uniform, and there were oc-
casions when war markedly d isturbed the growth of the market. Never-
theless, between 1794 and 1822, the Cuban demand for provisions shipped 
through Philadelphia was first established and then enlarged. 
Over the course of the same three decades, Philadelphia's trade to Cuba 
diversified to the outports. Throughout the 1790s Havana did receive the 
overwhelming majority of Philadelphia vessels destined for the Spanish 
island. Only a scant few ships cleared directly for the next largest port, 
Santiago de Cuba. However, by the beginning of the nineteenth century, 
departures to Santiago increased noticeably while other, smaller ports also 
appeared on the lists. Philadelphia's traffic with Cuba continued to diver-
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Table 2..I. Continued 
Year Cleared for Arrived from 
All Cuba Havana All Cuba Havana 
1805 78 46 n.a. n.a. 
1806 117 66 (lllln.a. n.a. 
1807 (115) 56 40 (Jan.-july) [138)n.a. n.a. 
1808 25 20 (May-Dec.) n.a. n.a. 
1809 [80) 91 50 [91) n.a. n.a. 
1810 79 57 n.a. n.a. 
1811 73 41 n.a. n.a. 
1812 38 18 n.a. n.a. 
1813 25 16 n.a. n.a. 
1814 33 32 n.a. n.a. 
1815 65 39 n.a. n.a. 
1816 60 37 19 12 (Oct.- Dec.) 
1817 60 38 8 4 (Mar.-Apr.) 
1818 69 39 n.a. n.a. 
1819 75 38 n.a. n.a. 
1820 91 47 n.a. n.a. 
1822 100 50 n.a. n.a. 
SOURCES: Figures in ( ] are from Roy F. Nichols, "Trade Relations and the Establish· 
ment of the Uni ted States Consulates in Spanish America, 1779-1809," Hispanic American 
Historical Review, 13 (August 1933): 2.89-313. Figures in I l are taken from charts supplied 
by Valentin Faronda in Archivo Hist6rico Nacional (Madrid), Secci6n de Estado, legajo 
6175 bis. 
n.a. = not available in consulted American primary sources. 
sify after the War of 1812. By 1822 only one-half of all its clearances went to 
H avana. Santiago, the rapidly expanding Matanzas and, to a far lesser ex-
tent, Nuevitas, Trinidad, and Baracoa received the remainder. 9 Planters out-
side the Cuban capital increasingly fostered their own direct state-side con-
nections. Havana no longer monopolized the colony's commerce with the 
United States although it did continue to dominate it. These trends are 
hardly surprising, given the growing white, free black, and slave popula-
tions; the geographical expansion of sugar cultivat ion on the island; and 
the entry of new American merchants into the profitable Cuban trade. 
Extant arrivals data for Philadelphia from Havana are far less complete 
than the departures series. Still, the recorded yearly entrances track closely 
with the clearances, implying a strong bilateral trade between these ports. 
To the extent that seasonal cycles can be determined, the number of arriv-
als and departures both tended to increase across the calendar year. This 
pattern suggests some coordination between vessel traffic and the Pennsyl-
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vania wheat harvest. Departures from Philadelphia peaked in the third and 
fourth quarters (June through November). By late summer or early fall 
enough time had elapsed for the American crop to be harvested, milled, 
transported to the city, inspected, sold, and loaded on ships. Those ships de-
parting on a late fall schedule-as they did with greater frequency after 
r8r5- left Philadelphia before fear of ice on the Delaware River became a real 
threat. By so doing they arrived in Cuba close to the beginning of the sugar 
harvest (around December). However, if the same shippers planned to carry 
the island product back to Philadelphia for refining, the figures should reflect 
a higher number of arrivals early in the new year. But this is not the case. In-
sofar as the fragmentary arrivals data for Philadelphia are representative, 
they indicate that inward traffic was greatest during the fourth quarter. Thus 
it appears that H avana served Philadelphia primarily as an agricultural ex-
port market rather than a cyclical source of sugar imports.10 
In other words, the bilateral trade was driven more by Cuban demand 
for provisions than by the mainland demand for sugar. Small wonder, then, 
that commercial politics were centered on the commodity flour. As pointed 
out below, operators like the Conde de Mopox y Jaruco and his cronies 
schemed to profit by restricting the flour supply and thus distorting the 
market in H avana. Their activities illustrate how political power and rent 
seeking went hand in hand during the Napoleonic Era. 
Of course Philadelphia's relationship with Cuba needs to be examined in 
the context of its total outbound traffic. A ro percent sample of all recorded 
clearances from Philadelphia between 1794 and 1822 confirms the signifi-
cance of Caribbean destinations in general and of Cuban ones in particular.11 
T he Caribbean as a whole accounted for nearly one-half of all departures 
and two-fifths of all tonnage declared for foreign ports at Philadelphia. 
When the islands are classified by parent state, the Spanish possessions -
primarily Cuba but also Santo Domingo and Puerto Rico-easily outrank 
the others as Philadelphia's preferred trading partners. This pattern appears 
to have stabilized over time. Moreover, when individual Caribbean ports are 
ranked by tonnage at five-year intervals, Havana usually occupies either first 
or second place while Santiago frequently ranks within the top five as well. 
Furthermore, in r8oo and 1805, H avana led all foreign clearances from 
Philadelphia, including those to Europe and the Far East. 
Thus H avana (and, to a lesser extent, Santiago) exerted a demand for 
Philadelphia's exports aJI out of proportion to its size. To apply Price's 
model, the growing Cuban market had profound ramifications for Phila-
delphia. Merchants, shippers, millers, coopers, carters, and farmers all 
profited from this trade.12 
Ship manifests, insurance policies, and aggregate trade statistics for the 
United States and Cuba shed some light on the composition of outbound 
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merchandise. By all indications the principal export from Philadelphia and 
the rest of the mainland as well was domestically produced flour. In 1790, 
for example, this commodity alone accounted for approximately 50 per-
cent of the value of total American exports to the Spanish West Indies, 
a reliable proxy for Cuba.13 Unfortunately, comparable estimates are not 
available for the intervening period down to 1821. For that year, however, 
the value of United States flour sent to Cuba amounted to $675,952, repre-
senting 23 percent of the value of all domestic exports there and nearly 
16 percent of American flour exports worldwide.14 
Aside from flour, the United States sent a wide assortment of other pro-
visions to the island. Pork products, wood (processed into staves, planks, 
and containers for sugar), tallow candles, soap, rice, and footwear trailed 
flour by value on the aggregate level in 1821. Individual cargoes usually 
included some combinations of the following foodstuffs as well: fish, beef, 
dairy products, other grains and flours (corn, rye, barley), legumes (beans, 
peas, potatoes), apples, and beer. Nails, agricultural implements, cottons, 
hats, coaches, furniture, gunpowder, medicines, horses, and mules also ap-
peared with varying frequency. Spanish imperial authorities taxed most 
of these imports, reserving preferential rates not for the needed comestibles 
but for wood and iron products. The composition of Cuba-bound cargoes 
did not appear to change dramatically between 1779 and 1823. However, 
the dollar value of domestic produce sent from the United States tended 
to increase after 1803 as the overall value of reexports dropped off. On 
the whole, then, trade with Cuba provided Americans with a ready outlet 
for their agricultural surpluses and simple manufactures even as U.S. ship-
pers dominated at least 40 percent of Cuba's foreign trade.15 
As far as cargoes sent back from Cuba are concerned, in 1821 over 60 
percent of the sugar products that entered the United States came from 
Cuba.16 Still, sugar was not always the commodity Americans preferred. 
Especially for those also active on other routes, specie became an attrac-
tive return cargo. Havana received regular influxes of hard coin from the 
Viceroyalty of New Spain, and it is clear that hundreds of thousands of 
these pesos flowed northward annually. One British diplomat estimated 
that over $500,000 of Spanish American silver entered Philadelphia alone 
in 178].17 Several years later Stephen Girard's resident correspondent in 
Havana accumulated such massive amounts of coin that he had to hoard 
and even bury some before completing shipments off the island.18 Aside 
from functioning as direct remittance for goods and services, specie was 
carried by American merchants to be minted or transferred to accounts 
in Europe. For example, the Philadelphia merchant John Leamy took out 
six separate insurance policies in March 1794 to protect specie-laden ships 
departing Havana with quantities ranging in value from $7,ooo to $24,000. 
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Six months later he purchased another policy on $80,000 worth of pesos 
to be transported on at least four different ships. Finally, American ship 
captains smuggled out thousands of pesos on individual voyages. Usually 
coins were concealed in the bottoms of sugar containers.19 
Much as they tried, Spanish imperial officials could not stop the drain 
of hard currency from Cuba. They did, however, attempt to link specie 
exports to the slave trade in order to augment the colony's labor force. As 
of r802, specie could be legitimately exported from Cuba only as proceeds 
from the sale of slaves. Another policy implemented in 1789 had tied slaves 
to flour importations as well. Flour-laden ships from the United States 
received preferential treatment if they also brought in unfree blacks. 20 
American flour merchants thus had two incentives to participate in the slave 
t rade to Cuba. But the extent to which they did so remains unclear. While 
some United States slavers, usually based in New England, made large de-
liveries directly from Africa, many American vessels appear to have stopped 
at nearby Dutch and Danish islands on their way to Cuba. There they 
picked up only a few slaves, at most enough to facilitate the discharge of 
their Bour cargoes in the Spanish West Indies. Additional evidence from 
consular and business correspondence suggests that at least some flour 
traders from Philadelphia operated accordingly. 21 
If not all North American ships entered Havana harbor with slaves on 
board, it is hard to imagine that many arrived without flour. Quantities 
ranged from a few dozen to a few thousand barrels, rendering average 
estimates unhelpful. For example, fifteen flour-laden American vessels-
all but three from Philadelphia-were legally admitted between April r4 
and June 25, 1796. The median number of American barrels delivered was 
897; however, individual cargoes ranged from 57 to 2,240 barrels. 22 Other 
evidence implies that large-scale operators such as Leamy and Girard tried 
to send around 2,000 barrels per voyage. U.S. suppliers faced no serious 
competition on the Havana flour market, which expanded rapidly after 
q90. But how large was it? Even imperial bureaucrats, intent upon minimiz-
ing their estimates, conceded that Cuba took over 100,000 barrels per year 
in the first decade of the nineteenth century. By 1829 official annual im-
ports surpassed 200,000 barrels. 23 Still, American sellers did not have an 
easy time in Havana. Delays in unloading together with improper storage, 
capricious enforcement of commercial regulations, and a system whereby 
the powerful bakers' guild purchased most of the flour, all interfered with 
the efficient transaction of business. 
The instability of the Havana flour market is further demonstrated by 
comparing selling prices there and in Philadelphia. Since neither colonial 
officials nor Cuban newspapers regularly recorded flour prices, one must 
look to American letters, periodicals, and prices current for information 
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regarding both ports. Fortunately the papers of Philadelphian Stephen 
Girard contain enough data to allow the construction of a series for Havana 
that runs from February 1797 to February 1824. Girard often complained 
about the sluggish flow of information northward, but his agents sent 
relatively frequent quotations. 24 In short, the paired prices demonstrate 
the distorting effects of the Napoleonic Wars because only after 1815 did 
American and Cuban prices consistently move together. 25 
It is instructive to scrutinize this price series by quarters. Between Janu-
ary 1797 and December 1801 a barrel of Philadelphia flour sold in Havana 
for anywhere from $13.50 to $24.00. For this period only there is a slight 
negative correlation -implying an inverse relationship-between prices in 
Havana and those from the preceding month in Philadelphia. Why should 
rising prices have prevailed in Cuba when falling prices were current in Penn-
sylvania? A plausible explanation for the most dramatic episode, which oc-
curred at the end of 1798, involves the royal concession granted to the Conde 
de Mopox y Jaruco to supply the island with 100,000 barrels of flour.26 As 
delivery and sales were channeled through the Mopox network in 1797 and 
1798, prices in Havana init ially rose. But in their haste to transport the pref-
erentially taxed flour to Cuba, his agents soon glutted the market. Worse 
still, these barrels were so improperly stored that bakers refused to purchase 
the "moldy merchandise." Their written protests correspond closely with the 
drop in prices in Havana during the second half of 1798. 27 
Philadelphia and H avana flour prices were again noticeably at odds dur-
ing the last six months of 1800 when, it appears, a specie crisis was to 
blame. According to contemporary assessments there simply was not enough 
currency in circulation to facilitate purchases. On July 15 Girard's correspon-
dent wrote: "The market is extremely dull, flour the only good article, cash 
very scarce."28 Then, more than 150 American vessels arrived in H avana 
during the first three weeks of September. The available supply of fresh 
foodstuffs was thus inflated, further aggravating a dismal situation for sellers. 
Yet this was not the only occasion when multiple arrivals played havoc with 
the market. Indeed, concurrent deliveries of large quantities of flour prob-
ably affected sales more adversely than any other short-term factor. 29 
For the second and third quarters analyzed, which respectively cover 
the years from 1802 to 1807 and from 1808 to 1814, there are no obvious 
statistical relationships between price movements in Havana and Philadel-
phia. Cuban prices varied widely, from a low of $12 in March 1807 to an 
all-time high of $56 in September 1808. Despite the United States embargo 
having been in effect since December 1807, prices in Havana did not peak 
for another several months. Contact had not effectively ceased, it appears, 
until the end of 1808 when Cuban merchants requested provisions and 
vessels alike, and island inhabitants reportedly turned to locally grown 
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roots and vegetables. 30 As soon as the embargo was lifted, dozens of Ameri-
can ships raced to Havana. Within weeks (April 1809), flour sold at a mere 
$18 per barrel. Further disruptions occurred during the War of 181:z. but 
were never as severe as those contemporaneous with Jefferson's embargo. 31 
These two Anglo-American factors, it appears, proved far more damaging 
than the myriad commercial regulations the Bourbons tried to enforce. 
The fourth quarter in the series comprises the period from 1815 through 
18:z.4. Cuban quotations never approached the peaks of the preceding two 
periods. Furthermore for the first and only time flour prices in Havana 
and Philadelphia tended to move in the same direction; that is, they rose 
and fell together. 32 These trends, along with the stabilized patterns of vessel 
traffic discussed above, suggest that sustained peace brought a closer in-
tegration of the respective Bour markets. In other words, the link between 
Philadelphia and Havana was normalized once the fighting had ended and 
essentially peacetime trading conditions prevailed. 
In some ways the Cuba market held even greater significance for Phila-
delphia after the Napoleonic Wars. Indeed by the end of the second decade 
of the nineteenth century Cuba remained one of the few routes on which 
Philadelphia's outbound traffic had not registered either an absolute or a 
relative decline. 33 Rather, Havana and the outports continued to function 
as ready outlets for domestic produce and, to a far lesser extent, for reex-
ported goods. In comparative terms, Philadelphia's ties to Cuba were on 
the order of three times stronger than the nation's as a whole. In l8:z.1, 
Cuba was the declared destination of 6. 7 percent of all domestically pro-
duced U.S. exports by value. However, for the Philadelphia customs district, 
the same figure is 18.6 percent, worth over half a million dollars. 34 More-
over, of all U.S. domestic exports to Cuba in 1821, nearly :z.o percent had 
been shipped through Philadelphia. The same trade in agricultural surpluses 
that had been nurtured since prerevolutionary times by Quaker city mer-
chants still predominated more than half a century later. The regional 
agricultural savings emphasized in Price's model were closely linked to the 
Cuba trade well into the nineteenth century. 
Another extant set of local statistics from 1819 through 1827 suggests 
that the benchmark year of 18:z.1 was typical. When the nine annual totals 
are combined, Cuba emerges as the leading destination of recorded domes-
tic exports from Philadelphia. (See table 2.2.) Other regions of Spanish 
America-most notably Mexico-also figured quite prominently in Phila-
delphia's outbound trade. However, each of these hemispheric destinations 
received a far larger proportion of reexports than Cuba did. Rankings by 
value of total exports (that is, domestic exports plus reexports) reveal that 
only China outranked Cuba, and it did so overwhelmingly on the strength 
of reexports.35 (See tables 2.3 and :z..4.) Again Spain's "ever faithful isle" 
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Table 2..2.. Recorded Total Value (Dollars) of Domestic Exports from Philadelphia 
to Principal Foreign Trading Partners, 1819-i.7 
Rank Trading Partner Value 
1. Cuba 4,855,633 
2. England 4,398,736 
3. Danish West Indies 2,398,736 
[Spanish American nations) [2,631,632) 
4. Spanish American colonies 1,480,428 
5. Brazil 1,465,190 
6. H aiti 1,399,716 
7. Other Spanish West Indies 1,330,744 
8. Gibraltar 1,274,858 
9. British West Indies 1,025,349 
10. China 1,022,022 
SouRCE: Hazard's Register of Pennsylvania 2. (October 1828), 204-5. 
Each of the remaining thirry-6ve categories listed has a combined value for domestic ex-
ports of under $1 million for these nine years. Many of these individual categori!;!s reflect 
changes in political sovereignty in Spanish America during this interval. For example there 
are no figures for "Spanish American Colonies" after 1824 while separate listings for Mexico, 
Colombia, Peru, Chile, and Buenos Aires begin that same year. If these separate listings are 
combined as "Spanish American nations" (as above), the domestic exports sent from Phila-
delphia amount co $2,631,632, placing chem fourth on the above list. 
seemed a particularly appropriate market for Philadelphia and its grain-
producing hinterland, not only according to Jeffersonian political economy 
but also according to longstanding patterns of commercial exchange. 36 
Over time, however, such persistent and deepening reliance on Havana 
and other Cuban outlets affected Philadelphia adversely. Yet this is not 
because these markets were stagnant, as Anglo-Americanists routinely 
assume. Rather, recent research by Caribbeanists convincingly demonstrates 
that the size and wealth of Cuba's population continued to grow well into 
the nineteenth century.37 As far as demand is concerned, then, this story 
is dynamic and multi-faceted. In the early 1790s Havana and its environs 
were able to shift most local resources into sugar production, in large part 
because of a sure and steady supply of foodstuffs from Pennsylvania. The 
rapidly expanding white and black populations, the annual influx of thou-
sands of silver pesos from New Spain, as well as the de facto loosening 
of Bourbon commercial restrictions during wartime, made Cuba ever more 
attractive to merchants on the American mainland. 
Coinciding with the island's sugar revolution, the opening of Spanish 
imperial trade to neutrals in 1797 proved to be a watershed event. Before 
then, a small circle of Philadelphia flour dealers, men who cleverly ex-
50 Linda K. Salvucci 
Table 2.3. Recorded Value (Dollars) of Total Exports from Philadelphia 
to Principal Foreign Trading Partners, 1819-27 
Rank Trading Partner Value Percentage of 
Reexports 
1. China 12,837,583 92 
2. Cuba 7,605,609 36 
3. England 6,032,265 27 
4. Spanish American Colonies 5,155,495 71 
5 . Mexico 4,772,453 80 
6 . Danish West Indies 4,772,453 42 
7. Hanse towns 4,766,367 84 
[Spanish American nations] [3,440,533] [51] 
8. Gibraltar 3,005,791 57 
9. Haiti 2,320,055 39 
10. British East Indies 2,279,501 74 
11. Holland 2,213,418 87 
12. Brazil 2,121,042 31 
13. Other Spanish West Indies 2,037,560 34 
SOURCE: HaZPrd's Register of Pennsylvania 2. (October 182.8), 2.04-5. 
Each of the remaining thirty-two categories listed has a combined value for total exports 
for these nine years of under $2. million. Five of these categories are combined as "Spanish 
American nations"; in this instance Mexico is not included since it already appears in the 
rankings. 
ploited religious, familial, and bureaucratic ties, had dominated the Cuba 
route. 38 Of course they were best positioned to reap the first and fastest 
profits from the escalating demand for provisions and manufactured goods. 
However, opportunities in Havana were so great by the turn of the century 
that the ranks of American exporters swelled both in Philadelphia and in 
neighboring rival ports. For the next several decades Cuba depended upon 
the United States not only for more foodstuffs but for more reexports, ship-
ping services and, following the independence of Mexico, capital for in-
vestment in the sugar industry. Yet, in general, Philadelphians failed to react 
effectively to the more diversified island market. The old-time suppliers 
either died or left the trade while a larger number of smaller shippers con-
tinued to send cargoes composed mainly of provisions. 39 In contrast, New 
York merchants were in a strong position to service the enhanced needs 
of the Spanish colony. Like Philadelphia, New York possessed a rich agri-
cultural hinterland; unlike Philadelphia, New York aggressively pursued 
close trading connections with Europe which enabled it to function not 
only as a distribution point for regional produce but as an international 
entrepot. By the early 1820s Cuban hacendados could deal with northern 
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Table 2..4. Recorded Value (dollars) of Domestic Exports and Reexports from 
Philadelphia to Cuba, 181,-27 
Year Domestic Exports Reexports 
1819 NR" NR 
[760,959t [NR] 
1820 172,792 205,486 
[467,440t [680,144r 
1821 559,183 265,303 
1822 592,417 301,287 
1823 694,869 434,053 
1824 599,736 388,500 
1825 666,118 324,955 
1826 628,336 459,479 
1827 942,182 370,976 
Totals 4,855,633 2,749,976 
SOURCE: Hazard 's Register of Pennsylvania 2 (Ocmber 1828}, 204-5. 
"NR = not recorded. 
Total 
[760,959Jb 
378,278 
[1,147,584)b 
824,486 
893,704 
1,128,922 
988,236 
991,073 
1,087,815 
1,313,077 
7,605,609 
bValues for "Other Spanish West Indies"; "Cuba" became a separate category at some 
point during 1820. Thereafter values for other Spanish West Indies never exceeded more than 
a few thousand dollars. Braketed figures are not included in any of the totals. 
firms that offered a complete package of services including financing, 
transportation, and marketing of tropical products; access to manufactured 
and luxury goods; as well as increased supplies of food. Given the alter-
natives, it seems hardly a coincidence that New York, not Philadelphia, 
emerged as the center of the foreign sugar trade. 40 
A final factor on the supply side illustrates the eventual consequences 
of Philadelphia's adherence to tradit ional patterns of exchange with Cuba 
following the Napoleonic Wars. Because Bour prices fell in Pennsylvania 
beginning in the late 1810s, the terms of trade turned against Philadelphia. 
Between 1803 and 1807 Philadelphia had exported 221,136 barrels of Bour 
valued annually at $1,647,624 on average per annum. By 1821 Philadelphia 
exported 219,013 barrels of flour valued at $1,025,082. In other words, 
while exporting nearly the same quantity of flour in the later year, Phila-
delphia earned $622,542 a year less, a difference of some 47 percent.41 This 
figure serves as an approximate measure of how changes in the terms of 
trade from the war years now benefitted partners like Cuba at the same 
time that they cost Philadelphia. Without the disproportionately high profits 
of the neutral trade of the war years, flour merchants, shippers, millers, 
and other Philadelphians could not accumulate capital as rapidly as they 
once had. So lucrative and secure in the last quarter of the eighteenth cen-
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tury, the Cuba trade had diverted Philadelphia from extensive participa-
tion on other routes, especially those involving cotton and European manu-
factures. Yet this early success became a liability once the Havana market 
became too lucrative for other American competitors to ignore. Just as 
predominance in the Cuba trade paralleled the ascendancy of Philadelphia 
in the Revolutionary Era, changes in the structure of demand in Havana 
after 1800 contributed to Philadelphia's decline. 
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